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RELIEF OF FORFEITURE: EQUITY’S ANOMALOUS INTERVENTION 
FOLLOWING AN EVENT OF DEFAULT 
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Abstract: In the wake of the global financial crisis, borrowers found it increasingly challenging 
to obtain finance. Once credit had dried up, the pendulum swayed in favour of lenders during 
loan negotiations. In an effort to avoid and terminate unprofitable loan agreements, major 
banking institutions relied heavily on the punitive provisions that were set out in loan contracts, 
particularly the draconian material adverse change clause. Against this background, this paper 
analyses the material adverse change clause with particular reference to case law. It also 
examines defences that a borrower can seek to rely on in court, following the Turkish case of 
Cukurova Finance. The paper considers the doctrine of relief of forfeiture in the context of 
loan agreements and argues that it is a remedy a borrower should seek to raise in court. The 




A loan agreement contains numerous provisions that are incorporated by a bank in order to 
safeguard the lender’s position upon the borrower’s insolvency. It ‘excludes’ the banks’ 
exposure to a borrower who may become unable or unwilling to pay back the capital and 
interest under the loan.1 One example is the material adverse change (MAC) clause. A MAC 
clause permits the lender to suspend or terminate the facility agreement if there is an adverse 
change to the borrower’s circumstances. It exists as a ‘sweeping-up’ clause, to predict future 
problems, and to provide the lender with a wide scope of authority to call in the loan and 
demand repayment.2 In the UK, lenders will have discretion in whether they call in the loan,3 
since a ‘default notice’ and demand will usually be required to be made in terms of all the 
documentation that was provided under the loan.4 As a result, it is justifiably the most contested 
clause in the loan agreement. 
This paper will begin by examining MAC clauses (Part B). It will thereafter outline the 
case law that upholds the orthodox position that following an event of default, there is ‘no room 
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for equity to intervene in international banking contracts’5 to defend a borrower (Part C). This 
is set out in the cases of Grupo Hotelero Urvasco,6 IBP Inc,7 The Angelic Star8 and BNP 
Paribas v Yukos Oil..9 The paper will further argue that following the decisions in Concord 
Trust10 and Cukurova,11 courts have incorporated the property doctrine of relief of forfeiture in 
the context of loan agreements (Part D). Although Cukurova is not legally binding, this paper 
considers the case as persuasive. The decision is also of interest as it offers direction as to how 
the courts may approach setting the amount of compensation that will need to be returned to 
the borrower, if the doctrine is awarded to a borrower. The paper will thereafter examine the 
defences put forward by Zakrzewski and Winsor with regards to the test of reasonableness, 
specified in the Unfair Contracts Terms Act 1977 (Part E). It will be argued that these are weak 
solutions in comparison to relief of forfeiture, since the main hurdle would be establishing that 
both the borrower and lender did not ‘rely on their own intelligence’12 and did not anticipate 
the risks that a MAC clause would derive. The paper will conclude by arguing that a loophole 
has arisen that effectively permits equity to intervene in loan contracts when a borrower is able 
to remedy a default. 
 
B. THE MATERIAL ADVERSE CHANGE CLAUSE 
Chakrabarti and Brierley set out an example of the MAC clause as, ‘any event or series of 
events, which in the opinion of the Majority Lenders, is reasonably likely to have a material 
adverse effect [or change] on the business or financial condition of any member of the 
[borrowing company] or the [future] ability of any [borrower] to perform its obligations under 
any finance document.’13 Operating as an all-encompassing clause, the MAC clause provides 
the loan agreement with ‘teeth’. Its aim is to intimidate the borrower, ‘[acting] best in 
terrorem.’14 One may state that the clause aims to determine any unforeseen events that may 
occur to a borrower (usually of a financial nature) which may legally satisfy when a bank can 
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terminate the loan.15 Once a MAC clause is triggered, the aftermath could prove to be grievous 
as financial stability and trust between the parties is broken. The default cuts the strings 
attaching the credit to the borrower and leaves the debtor in uncharted waters as he searches 
for foreign capital in an attempt to pay back the creditor. There will be no obligation on behalf 
of the lender to generate more capital or ‘exonerate good money after bad’ to the borrower.16 
Hence, the clause is purposely envisioned to be absolute by tipping the pendulum and 
bargaining power in favour of the bank. 
In order to mitigate risk and maximise protection for the lender, Youard highlights the 
importance of prudence when drafting a MAC clause. In his view, the purpose of a MAC clause 
is to ‘specify the circumstances in which the lender can [lawfully] ask for immediate 
repayment’ of the outstanding capital, before the predicted date of maturity of the loan 
agreement.17 During negotiations, the creditor’s solicitors will identify all notable concerns that 
the lender has regarding any events of default and the clause will be drafted with these in mind. 
In contrast, the borrower’s solicitors will attempt to mitigate the wide-ranging scope of the 
MAC clause. In order to appreciate the scope of the clause, the following section looks at the 
criteria that need to be fulfilled in the three elements of ‘Material’, ‘Adverse’, and ‘Change’.  
1. Material 
The first criterion, the material, is outlined as a ‘long-term and substantial’18 impact, since a 
‘temporary change [or after-effect] in a borrower’s circumstances is unlikely to be treated as 
material’ or important.19 In Levison v Farin, it was held that the ‘scale of impact necessary for 
a material adverse change to be called, was a 20% fall in the value of a company’s assets.’20 
For instance, Zarkzewski clarifies that for a change to be material, it must simply ‘[affect] the 
borrower’s ability to repay, or significantly increase the risks assumed by the lender’.21 This 
broadens the scope of what can amount to material. In order for the adverse effect to be 
regarded as material, all circumstances and facts must be prudently measured, since the more 
precise the clause is about what changes will be of a significant nature, the easier it will be for 
the creditor to rely on the clause. 22 However, it is the lender who must prove that this impairs 
                                               
15 Levison v Farin (1978) 2 All ER 1149. 
16 [2013] EWHC 1039, 336. 
17 Richard Youard, ‘Default in international loan agreements - Part 1’ (1986) JBL 276, 277. 
18 IBP, Inc v Tyson (2001) LEXIS 81 (Del Chanc). 
19 Jo Windsor, ‘When can a material adverse change clause be relied on?’ (2013) BJIB&FL 28, 36. 
20 [1978] 2 All ER 1149 3. 
21 [2013] EWHC 1039 356; Rafal Zakrzewski, ‘Material Adverse Change and Material Adverse Effect Provisions: 
Construction and Application’ (2011) 5(5) LFMR 344, 352 
22 Chakrabarti and Brierley (n 13) 454. 
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the borrower’s ability to perform its commitments and repay the loan. Unlike the borrower, the 
lender has secured his position by incorporating a MAC clause into an agreement, since it 
provides scope to terminate the agreement based on a subjective belief that the borrower's 
financial condition has deteriorated. 
2. Adverse 
The second criterion is that the change must be ‘adverse’ in nature and contrary to the lender’s 
initial forecasts when the loan was negotiated. This usually involves the borrower’s financial 
stability. Zakrzewski suggests reference to the Oxford English Dictionary to appreciate the 
scope of this word which defines adverse as: ‘opposing any one’s real or supposed interests [or 
expectations]; hence an unfavourable, hurtful, detrimental, injurious, calamitous, [or] 
afflictive’. 23  The majority of lenders’ reasonable view is that an adverse effect must be 
detrimental in order for it to trigger an immediate event of default. The default will be decided 
by exercising the lenders subjective judgment of what constitutes a calamitous effect on the 
borrower’s circumstances, which increases the scope of the lender’s security against the 
borrower. 
3. Change 
The third requirement that must be established is that there has been a degree of ‘change’. A 
change can be defined as a variation or a sequence of anomalies in the circumstances or 
dealings of the borrower, which merit the termination of a loan agreement. The key variation 
will usually concern, but not limited to, the commercial dealings and financial wellbeing of the 
borrower. In order for the clause to be triggered, the degree of change must prevent a borrower 
or his/her business’s ability to pay back the creditor, due to an exacerbating degree of variation 
in circumstances. 
 
C. THE ORTHODOX POSITION 
It is trite law in the UK that there is no envisioned room for a borrower to rely on equity to 
intervene in strictly negotiated banking agreements.24 The Supreme Court in Burmah Oil25 held 
that the parties to an agreement are bound by the strict contractual interpretation of the terms 
that they agreed to in the contract. In this case, the claimant could not undermine or set aside 
the loan based on it being ‘unconscionable and inequitable’.26 This verifies the weight the 
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courts place on contractual terms and how they will rank above any dogma of good faith. 
Similarly, the argument that a loan agreement should be set aside due to it being unconscionable 
was rejected in Multiservice Bookbinding Ltd v Marden.27 Here, the courts held that a literal 
approach would be used when interpreting the terms of the loan and so there would be no room 
for equity to intervene. In contrast, under New York law, the courts seem to take a more 
generous stance. In Eighth Avenue,28 the courts endorsed a requirement upon the creditor to act 
in good faith in order to prevent the oppressive and ‘harsh [nature]’29 that an acceleration clause 
may convey on a borrower. 30 
1. Grupo Hotelero Urvasco 
In Grupo Hotelero Urvasco SA v Carey Value Added S. the court shed light on the orthodox 
position and the construction of the MAC clause. 31 The Spanish hotel company and borrower, 
Grupo Hotelero Urvasco (GHU) issued a claim against Carey Value Added SL (Carey) for 
failing to advance funding under the loan agreement in 2008 following the sharp deterioration 
in the property market in Spain. GHU claimed that starving the development of funding at a 
time of tight credit caused the ultimate demise of the project. 32 The loss of profits, therefore, 
amounted to a breach of obligations that Carey had consented to under the agreement. As a 
result, GHU maintained that the defendant should be liable to pay damages for an unwarranted 
acceleration. Carey counter-claimed that GHU had defaulted within the terms of the loan 
agreement when the work on the structure of the building ceased and it failed to make payment 
of the interest due. Reference was made to Gardiner & Theobald’s due diligence report which 
proved GHU’s deteriorating position. 33 The creditor considered that since GHU was near 
insolvency, it was not required to extend their risk and resume more money under the facility 
agreement to the borrower. Therefore, Carey demanded a repayment of €55.4 million. In order 
to ascertain whether a financial deterioration had occurred, Blaire J turned to the construal of 
what the financial condition of the company encompassed when the agreement had been set  
up. The claimant argued that: 
[a]s a matter of ordinary language, financial condition does not encompass other matters 
such as future prospects of a company or external economic or market changes. Where 
                                               
27 [1979] Ch 84. 
28 4 AD 2d 754 164 NYS 2d 812 [1957]. 
29 100 Eighth Avenue Corporation v Morgenstern (1957) 4 AD 2d 754 (NYS). 
30 The requirement of good faith has also been codified under section 1-304 of the Uniform Commercial Code. 
31 [2013] EWHC 1039. 
32 ibid [3]. 
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a material adverse change clause is intended to extend to such matters, then these will 
be expressly stated in the clause.34 
This reinforced the judgment in Multiservice Bookbinding,35 which indicated that courts will 
base their interpretation of a MAC clause on the literal connotation of what is stipulated in the 
clause. The financial condition of the borrower would not incorporate volatile changes or trivial 
setbacks in the financial market. 
As Grupo Hotelero36 has confirmed, ‘there are no [UK] appellate decisions interpreting 
material adverse change clauses, and the few court trials that exist have failed to establish a 
consistent interpretation’ of the degree of severity that the MAC entails.37 This disregards the 
20 percent deteriorating financial threshold that was set out above in Levison v Farin38 and the 
courts’ attempt to construe what would amount to a MAC. Equally, it also proves that a MAC 
clause should not be overly specific, since ‘it will lack its underlying purpose as a wide-ranging 
sweeping-up clause if it starts to resemble a financial covenant’.39 
2. IBP inc v Tyson Foods 
Merger and acquisition agreements in the US typically contain MAC clauses with respect to 
business assets and shares. The buyers insist on agreements that provide them with maximum 
flexibility to terminate the agreement prior to completion, alleviating the risk by placing it on 
the other party. 40 The Delaware Court of Chancery interprets MAC clauses as unique and ‘sui 
generis, [since] it [very rarely finds] a material adverse change to have occurred’.41  This 
indicates that the US adopts a considerably more liberal approach, as opposed to the UK, when 
construing the severity and weight of a MAC. The Delaware Court of Chancery held that IBP’s 
deteriorating annual earnings of 64 percent, behind the comparable quarter in the year 2000 
and the $60.4 million accounting impairment charge amounted to a MAC. The court held that 
the MAC must be construed in the wider context ‘over a commercially reasonable period’ and 
measured in years, as opposed to weeks or months. 42 In this case, a mere setback in earnings 
would not amount to a MAC, as IBP’s net earnings and financial performance had inclinations 
                                               
34 ibid [348]. 
35 [1979] Ch 84. 
36 [2013] EWHC 1039. 
37 ibid [335]. 
38 [1978] 2 All ER 1149. 
39 Chakrabarti and Brierly (n 13) 454. 
40 Steven M Davidoff, ‘It’s Hard Out There for a Seller’ (DealBook, 24 September 2008) 
<http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2008/09/24/its-hard-out-there-for-a-seller/?_r=0> accessed 8 September 2016. 
41 Andrew A Schwarz, ‘A “Standard Clause Analysis” of the Frustration Doctrine and Material Adverse Change 
Clause’ (2010) 57 UCLA L Rev 789. 
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to fluctuate. In order for a buyer to legally trigger the MAC clause, he would be required to 
evidence that the change was unknown and it would be detrimental in the long-term prospects 
of the target company. As a result, the Chancery court placed the burden of proof on the buyer 
to justify terminating the original agreement, based on the MAC clause and concluded that the 
MAC had not occurred. Consequently, IBP’s application for specific performance was 
approved.43 
It appears that US courts occasionally adopt miscellaneous interpretations based on the 
individual facts of each case. In Pacheco v Cambridge Technology Partners,44 it was assumed 
that the deterioration in financial condition (such as stock-price and Cambridge’s decline in 
total growth revenue from 20 percent to 7 percent), was irrelevant. It was held as a matter of 
law that this did not amount to a breach of the MAC clause because it only indicated the 
company’s future prospects and not an overall deterioration of material nature. Hence, it was 
asserted that a decline in performance would need to entail a ‘comparison [from] year-over-
year’.45 This proves that it is more challenging to terminate an acquisition agreement in the US 
based on a small decline in net earnings, rather than in the context of a loan agreement in the 
UK 
3. The Angelic Star 
An unorthodox attempt to mitigate and challenge the scope of the MAC clause was made in 
case of The Angelic Star.46 The borrower disputed the banks acceleration and argued that the 
repayment on demand constituted an act in terrorem and a punitive clause, capriciously 
penalising the borrower and should therefore not be permitted. Donaldson J rejected the 
defence clarifying that ‘the acceleration clause does not increase the contract-breaker’s overall 
obligation.’47 Moreover, the Court of Appeal held that ‘it was not a penalty for a lender to 
request full repayment’ 48  of the capital under the loan, when the borrower breaches his 
obligations by failing to pay back an instalment. It would only amount to a penalty if additional 
interest was added to the capital requested, similar to an overdraft. 
One may criticise that morality and fairness are disregarded in a financial context and 
replaced with the strict commercial and literal construction of what was agreed under the 
                                               
43 [2001] 789 A2d 14 [Del Ch] 24. 
44 [2000] 85 F Supp 2d 69 [D.Mass]. 
45 Davis Polk & Wardwell, ‘Memorandum of Court decisions Interpreting MAE Provisions’ 2. 
46 [1988] 1 Lloyds Rep 122. 
47 Hugh Beale, Chitty on Contracts (31st edition, Sweet & Maxwell 2012) 26-187. 
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contract. There is no room for equity to intervene and remedy the contract-breaker.49 It is 
expected that the courts would in any case be reluctant to step away from precedent. It appears 
that lenders have safeguarded and strengthened their position. They have left very little scope 
for a borrower to remedy a default. 
4.  BNP Paribas v Yukos 
The creditor’s strong position was also illustrated in the Chancery Division, in BNP Paribas v 
Yukos Oil.50 Here, a syndicate of thirteen banks advanced $473 billion to the defendant. The 
loan agreement exhibited numerous examples in Clause 19, as to when an event of default 
could be triggered.51 In 2003, following an investigation into the defendant companies, a series 
of materially adverse events occurred. First, Yukos Oils’ Chief Executive Officer was arrested. 
This triggered the MAC clause and the event of default provision under Clause 19.27 of the 
loan. Second, the CEO resigned and the Russian Ministry of Tax fined the defendant company 
$3.3 billion. Third, Standard & Poor downgraded Yukos’ credit rating and its assets were 
frozen. As a result, the loans under the agreement became due. Yukos Oil argued that the notice 
of the event of default was damaging to the Group and that in reality, the claimants stood to 
benefit from the ‘wrongful act’,52 triggering the default. Evans-Lombe J rejected the claimant’s 
submission and held that there was no reasonable prospect that Yukos could prove that BNP 
Paribas had relied on unreasonable information, which benefited them to terminate the contract. 
He referred to the dicta held by LJ Cockburn in Stirling v Maitland,53 that ‘if a party enters into 
an arrangement which can only take effect by continuance of a certain existing set of 
circumstances, there is an implied engagement on his part that he shall do nothing of his own 
motive to put an end to that state of circumstances under which the engagement can be 
operative’.54 The claimants argued that the material adverse effect should be considered on the 
‘business, condition or production or export capacity of the Group taken as a whole’.55 The 
defendants claimed that although the borrower faced financial difficulties, it had not affected 
the capacity of the Group as a whole. Hence, they disputed the MAC despite Yukos filing for 
a US bankruptcy petition and defaulting on its payment of interest. The Chancery division 
applied the Stirling principle and held that in order for the event of default to constitute a breach 
                                               
49 Burmah Oil (n 5). 
50 [2005] All ER (D) 281. 
51 ibid [8]. 
52 [2005] EWHC 1321 (Ch) [15]. 
53 [1864] 122 ER 1043. 
54 [2005] All ER (D) 281 [22-3]. 
55 [2005] All ER (D) 281 [7]. 
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of contract, the defendant would need to prove that there was an implied term in the loan 
agreement, in which the bank had agreed not to accelerate.56 As such, the banks succeeded in 
their claim and were entitled to demand full repayment of the money. The case of BNP Paribas 
cemented the orthodox position that there was no room for equity to intervene in contractual 
loan agreements to remedy a breach. This proves that more often than not, the pendulum swings 
in favour of the creditor in the UK, especially when the borrower is bound by stringent terms 
under a loan agreement. 
 
D. RELIEF OF FORFEITURE 
This section explores two notable cases where courts have incorporated the property doctrine 
of relief of forfeiture in the context of loan agreements. As will be explored below courts have 
begun to move away from a traditional orthodox position as discussed above. Relief of 
forfeiture is a doctrine found in land law, which is obtainable only by court order. It is defined 
as a ‘remedy only available to a mortgagee, [when] the mortgagor loses its rights, so that the 
mortgagee becomes the absolute legal or equitable owner of the assets.’57 On this element of 
property law, Gray and Gray58 provide further clarification: ‘the right to re-enter the demised 
premises and forfeit the lease or tenancy is the most draconian weapon in the armoury of the 
landlord, whose tenant has committed a breach of covenant.’59 In a parallel manner, the creditor 
is entitled to terminate the loan agreement when an event of default has occurred. It is 
demonstrated that the courts have equitable jurisdiction to provide relief and the ‘power to 
reinstate [a] lease, where it is just and equitable to do so, provided that the tenant pays all the 
rent owed to and costs incurred by the landlord.’60 This is complemented by statute in the 
Common Law Procedures Act 1852, where statutory protection is offered to a tenant. It is 
stipulated that a tenant is permitted to have legal proceedings postponed if he can pay the rental 
arrears, before the date of the judgment, ‘six months after possession has been made.’ 61 
Alternatively, the court can grant the identical protection provided by statute, by seeking 
equitable discretion via the doctrine of relief against forfeiture. This averts the tenant’s penalty 
if he is able to pay all the arrears within six months of the landlord’s possession. In Barton 
Thompson & Co Ltd v Stapling Machines Co,62 relief was granted by the courts when the 
                                               
56 BNP Paribas v Yukos Oil [2005] All ER (D) 281 [22]. 
57 Louise Gullifer and Jennifer Payne, ‘Corporate Finance Law - Principles and Policy’ (1st edn, OUP 2011) 282. 
58 Gray and Gray, ‘Elements of Land Law’ (5th edn, OUP 2009). 
59 ibid [4.4.2]. 
60 [2005] UKHL 27 [39-40]. 
61 Common Law Procedures Act 1852, s 210. 
62 [1966] Ch 499. 
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‘tenant [produced] realistic evidence of his ability to pay off arrears of rent during the fixed 
period within the immediate foreseeable future.’63 
1. Concord Trust 
In Concord Trust v The Law Debenture Trust Corporation Plc,64 Elektrim BV, a subsidiary of 
the guarantor company Elektrim SA, issued several Eurobonds. Condition 12 of the bond 
agreement specified that under the events of default clause, one of the requirements was that 
Elektrim SA had to ‘perform or observe’65 the obligations made by the bondholders. Condition 
12 also set out that a failure to observe these obligations would not amount to an event of 
default, unless the failure was ‘materially prejudicial to the interests of the bondholders’.66 The 
main issue in this case was whether the suspension of the nominee, Mr Rymaszewski, 
constituted an event of default under Condition 10(d), and whether the Trustee’s failure to 
accelerate was unlawful. An important term of the bond agreement was that all material 
decisions were to be decided taking into account the verdict of all the bondholders. Lord Scott 
of Foscote expressed that although the Trustee held discretionary powers, ‘30% of the 
bondholders [had] requested [that] the Trustee take action’67 and accelerate. One argument that 
was raised considered the effect that a dishonest acceleration would make the Trustee liable for 
conspiring with the bondholders, as this would cause Elektrim ‘injury by unlawful means’.68 
The court rejected the argument as fanciful and unarguable.69 Drawing an analogy to property 
law, Lord Scott in obiter dictum, took a conflicting view to Lord Denning’s judgment in TC 
Trustees Ltd v JS Darwen (Successors) Ltd.70 He emphasised that ‘[a] landlord, in the bona 
fide belief that his tenant has committed a breach of covenant, may give notice to the tenant to 
remedy the believed breach. If the notice is not complied with, then he may serve a forfeiture 
notice and institute proceedings for possession. The tenant can challenge the forfeiture and 
deny that any breach of covenant has occurred. This challenge may succeed.’71 Hence, the 
Trustee was obliged to respect both Clauses 10 and 12 and demand repayment, because the 
suspension of the nominee was considered a material and detrimental matter. Concord72 proves 
that courts will construe a clause within its context and that it is to be obeyed based on its literal 
                                               
63 ibid. 
64 [2005] UKHL 27. 
65 ibid 6. 
66 ibid. 
67 ibid 4. 
68 ibid 39. 
69 ibid. 
70 [1969] QB 295. 
71 [2005] UKHL 27, 39. 
72 [2005] UKHL 27. 
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interpretation. The fact that the Trustee regarded the clause as draconian and not ‘materially 
prejudicial’73 was irrelevant. There was no contractual breach or tortious duty of care that was 
owed by the Trustee. 
Contrary to the orthodox position of Burmah Oil,74 this suggests that equity does indeed 
have the power to intervene in strictly agreed contractual agreements. Nonetheless, it is 
debatable whether Lord Scott was aware in Concord75 that this would amount to a loophole for 
a borrower to seek relief and challenge the acceleration as was the case in Cukurova, where the 
borrower was seeking relief and challenged the acceleration. In the author’s view, Concord 
was the catalyst that invited the marvels of equity and the doctrines of property law to act in 
unison and intervene in an attempt to soften the rigidities of contract agreements when there is 
an event of default or, when the borrower breaches a MAC clause. 
2. Cukurova Finance 
The much-anticipated Privy Council appeal concerned the Turkish conglomerate, Cukurova 
Group’s (including its telecom subsidiaries Cukurova Finance International (CFI) and 
Cukurova Holding’s (CH)) application to petition the Court of Appeal’s decision of the Eastern 
Caribbean Supreme Court. The key issue disputed was whether the lender, Alfa Telecom 
Turkey Ltd (ATT) had been entitled to accelerate and demand immediate repayment, since the 
MAC provision had been breached. Perhaps more importantly, it was disputed whether 
Cukurova Group was entitled to relief from forfeiture. In other words, whether there was any 
room for equity to intervene in international loan agreements to mitigate the severity of a MAC 
provision. In order to answer this question, it is vital to examine the facts of the case by 
considering the drafting of the clause and how it applies to the facts. 
In September 2005, ATT and the Cukurova Group entered into a facility agreement, 
where ATT accepted to lend its subsidiary, CFI, $1.352 billion, which was secured as collateral 
on shares in the subsidiary companies. An unsecured facility of $355 million was also advanced 
to CFI at a later date. Amongst several obligations stipulated under the facility agreement, 
clause 16.4 obliged the Cukurova Group to obey all actions ‘[ATT] may reasonably request for 
the purpose of perfecting the security’.76 Clause 17 recorded seventeen sub-headings with 
potential ‘events of default’. It also set out the MAC provision, which established that ‘[a]ny 
event or circumstance which in the opinion of [ATT] has had or is reasonably likely to have a 
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75 [2005] UKHL 27. 
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material adverse effect on the financial condition, assets or business of [CFI]’ would permit 
ATT to accelerate and terminate the loan.77 In effect, the MAC clause was to be construed 
using the subjective judgment of the creditor. This offered the lender wide-ranging scope to 
terminate the loan based on an opinion, as opposed to something more concrete such as 
financial data. Whether the court had objectively established the existence of the event of 
default was irrelevant.78 The lending arrangement was an equally attractive transaction for 
ATT. The lender secretly predicted an event of default by Cukurova Group, since it knew that 
the subsidiary companies would be unable to pay back the interest. Bannister J affirmed this 
and held that the defendant’s commercial aim had been to adopt the ownership of the 
borrower’s collateral, as it attempted to ‘starve [the company] of funds and blocked the 
payment of dividends of CTH’79 to challenge the claimant in an effort to force them to default. 
In 2007, the Geneva Group faced severe complications when telecommunications company, 
Sonera issued a press release that it had been awarded 52.91 percent holding in TCH following 
an arbitration award, which amounted to $3.1 million. ATT sent the claimant a letter alleging 
that the Cukurova Group was in financial difficulty, as sixteen events of default had been 
breached under the facility agreement. An immediate acceleration and demand for repayment 
of the capital and interest was made, as well as a claim to be registered as the sole owners of 
the charged shares in the subsidiary companies. ATT later held a press conference which 
recorded Cukurova’s deteriorating financial state in order to ‘cast [the company] in a bad light 
as [much as] possible to make it difficult for them to raise [secondary] finance’80 to pay off its 
debts. The borrower argued that this was an attempt to deter any other companies from 
advancing money on the shares. This spurred ATT to appropriate the charged shares, declaring 
that it was entitled to do so under the terms of the loan agreement. CFI sent a formal notice 
eight days later to ATT that it had the ability to repay the defendant the contractual interest, 
however ATT refused, claiming that it was too late. Following the precedent set out in Concord, 
the subsidiary companies began proceedings in an attempt to redeem their shares and oblige 
ATT to accept the repayment in order to discharge the loan. 
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a) Court Proceedings 
The High Court considered whether there had been a legitimate event of default and if so, 
whether ATT could legally appropriate the shares. Bannister J who heard the arguments held 
that all sixteen of the alleged events of default were unsuccessful. It was held that even if the 
defendant had failed to justify the appropriation of the shares, because of its bad faith and 
improper motive, it would not avail the claimant’s argument. 81 The claimant also raised the 
doctrine of relief of forfeiture. Bannister J brushed over the argument and held that it was 
unnecessary to consider as the defendant was obliged to return the shares. The Court of Appeal 
reversed the High Court decision and held that three events of default had in fact occurred.82 It 
did, however, agree with the High Court that any improper motive on behalf of the defendant 
would not benefit the claimants.83 As such, it was held that ATT was entitled to appropriate the 
charged shares and upheld ATT’s appeal. The subsidiary companies appealed, arguing that no 
event of default had in fact occurred. In the event it had, however, the claimants should be 
entitled to relief from forfeiture since the appropriation of the shares was vitiated on bad faith.84 
Bannister J followed the High Court and reaffirmed in obiter dictum that ATT entered into the 
facility agreement and its associated instruments in the expectation that CH and CFI would 
default, with the intention of gaining shareholder control of Turkcell.  85 Nonetheless, it was 
rejected as under contract law, ATT was entitled to terminate the loan based on their subjective 
opinion that a MAC had occurred. The critical question turned to whether the courts had the 
prerequisite jurisdiction to grant the claimant relief of forfeiture, considering that the repayment 
of the loan to ATT was secured by equitable mortgages over the charged shares in Turkcell. In 
Shiloh Spinners Ltd v Harding86 Lord Wilberforce held that it is trite law that equity has always 
asserted ‘the right to relieve against the forfeiture of property’.87 The jurisdiction was not 
confined to any particular type of case and the commonest instances concerned mortgages, or 
where the forfeiture was, in the nature of a penalty.88 As such, it can be submitted that Cukurova 
developed the role of the equitable doctrine that was suggested in Concord,89 as prior to this 
case, the property doctrine had not been considered before. Hence, it provided equity with a 
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wider scope to intervene in international loan agreements, where property was used as 
collateral and to offer the borrower a second chance to rectify the contract. As revealed in 
Peachy v Duke of Somerset,90 where it is possible to assert that the object of the transaction and 
of the insertion of the right to forfeit is to secure the payment of money, equity has been willing 
to relieve on terms that the payment is made with interest.91 As such, the claimants stated that 
there was sufficient precedent, which illustrated that it was possible for equity to intervene and 
soften the consequences of an event of default following a MAC clause. 
Section 146(2) of the Law and Property Act 1925 also sets out that a court has the 
authority and discretion to grant or reject relief if notice of the breach has been provided, as 
well as a reasonable time thereafter to remedy the breach if it is achievable of being remedied. 
However, an issue that arose was whether the courts had jurisdiction to relieve the claimants 
in this case as it concerned shares; intangible property under a commercial agreement, as 
opposed to proprietary or personal rights under a contractual agreement. The courts held that 
there was no basis or authority to draw such a discrepancy, relying on the dicta affirmed by 
Dillion LJ in BICC plc v Burndy Corporation.92 They explained that it was necessary to be 
entirely ‘certain’93 about the transaction and to consider other detailed factors regarding the 
default, such as ‘the gravity of the breaches, the disparity between the value of the property of 
which forfeiture is claimed as compared with the damage caused by the breach.’94 Nonetheless, 
it seems that whether a borrower can provide this remains at the judge’s discretion. In Hyman 
v Rose, 95  Earl Loreburn LC elaborated on the level of discretion and held that the 
circumstances, including the conduct of the parties is to be considered by the court. 96 As a 
result, Cozens-Hardy MR depicted the necessity for Cukurova to remedy the breaches alleged 
in the notice, and pay reasonable compensation for the breaches which could not be remedied.97 
Since the Cukurova Group had the ability to repay ATT, the Board held that the claimant should 
be entitled to relief from forfeiture. 
b) Implications 
Cukurova marks the first major deviation from a traditionally strict contractual approach. 
Previously, courts had routinely been in favour of banks and in particular, the terms of the 
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lending contract. A good example is illustrated by the orthodox approach taken in Bank Of New 
York Mellon,98 BNP Paribas,99 and Grupo Hotelero.100 If a borrower failed to keep up with 
repayments then this automatically amounted to a default. Following Cukurova, however, it is 
expected that the pendulum will swing more equally in court for both the borrower and the 
lender. This paper suggests that a borrower should now seek to raise the defence of relief from 
forfeiture or attempt to incorporate equitable relief as a term in the loan agreement, during the 
negotiating process. Today, a borrower should not be at the mercy of the lender if he is able to 
contend that he has the ability to pay back the money owed under the loan agreement. In 
parallel, it is advised that a lender should still seek to rely on the traditional contractual 
provisions such as financial covenants, representations and cross-default clauses. However, it 
is likely that this type of remedy has several limitations. There is no evidence to prove that 
Cukurova has actually sent shockwaves throughout the financial markets. For instance, in the 
situation where the borrower is utterly insolvent, there will be no room for relief of forfeiture, 
as it is unlikely that another lender will provide additional capital if its credit rating has 
suffered. It is also debatable whether this remedy was only based on the individual facts of 
Cukurova. It is yet to be seen whether the case will set a precedent in the UK. On the other 
hand, with the development and invasion of the property doctrine into a financial context, one 
may argue that it unseals the floodgates for other areas of law to also intervene, such as human 
rights law.101 What is clear, however, is that relief from forfeiture has provided a loophole for 
equity to interfere and soften the harsh and draconian aftermath of the event of default. It has 
the ability to mitigate the severity of a MAC clause when an event of default has been triggered 
or the loan has been hastily accelerated, leading to an unfair or illegal result. 
 
E. OTHER DEFENCES 
It is also important to explore other defences that an insolvent borrower should choose to 
consider in the event of a default.102 These could pertain to: (i) Section 3(2)(b) of the Unfair 
Contract Terms Act 1977; (ii) The similarities between MAC clauses and Force Majeure 
clauses; and (iii) Contractual Protections. 
                                               
98 [2009] All ER (D) 155. 
99 [2005] All ER (D) 281. 
100 [2013] EWHC 1039. 
101 Article 1 of the Protocol to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Public Freedoms states 
that, no one shall be deprived of their possessions except in the public interest. It is not clear whether this would 
be a strong argument since one may argue that the monies received from a loan are not actually their possessions. 
102 Zakrzewski (n 21) 359. 
UCL Journal of Law and Jurisprudence 
281 
1. The Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977 
Zakrzewki states that a borrower should seek to rely on the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977 
(UCTA 1977) to mitigate the scope of the MAC clause. Section 3(2)(b) sets out that a borrower: 
cannot by reference to any contractual term claim to be entitled to: a) render a 
contractual performance substantially different from that which was reasonably 
expected of him, or b) render no performance at all, except in so far as the contract term 
satisfies the requirement of reasonableness.103 
Zakrzewski clarifies this by stating that a written standard form suggests ‘pre-printed contract 
forms or terms flashed up on a website rather than terms proffered by a party as a starting point 
for negotiations.’104 Once the standard form is satisfied, the borrower will still need to prove 
that the MAC clause does not fulfill the reasonableness condition. The borrower will also need 
to prove that the bank’s termination of the loan agreement has in itself varied the contractual 
performance substantially from that which was reasonably expected of the borrower. However, 
this interpretation is questionable. The borrower would fail to satisfy that he is a consumer, 
able to invoke section 3(2)(b) of the UCTA 1977.105 
An alternative viewpoint is set out by Winsor, who states that a court is more likely to 
construe the requirement by imposing the Wednesbury test of unreasonableness. 106  This 
restricts lenders from arriving at a decision which no reasonable person in their position would 
have made.107 The distinction is that the Wednesbury test confers a higher threshold on the 
borrower to prove that the clause was unreasonable, rather than the suggested statutory 
reasonableness requirement under the UCTA 1977. It is maintained here that the tests of 
reasonableness are contradictory, since ‘terms negotiated between commercial parties are 
[deemed to] satisfy the requirement of reasonableness’.108 This is illustrated by the doctrine of 
contractual estoppel, which was established in the case of JP Morgan Chase Bank v Springwell 
Navigation Corporation.109  In this case, Springwell Navigation Corporation purchased 42 
derivatives of rouble bonds from JP Chase Morgan Bank of GKO, which were issued by the 
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Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation. As the GKOs were exchanged using US dollars, 
Springwell lost a significant amount of money due to currency fluctuations and raised the 
argument that there was a duty of care owed to Springwell and so a negligent misstatement had 
occurred. The Court of Appeal held that JP Morgan was not accountable; the bond agreement 
contained a clause which demonstrated that the investors were to rely on their own 
intelligence.110 Examining the test of reasonableness under section 3(2)(b) of UCTA 1977, the 
Court upheld the contractual freedom of the agreement. It also clarified that Springwell was 
considered an intellectual and experienced investor, aware of the risk hazards that the 
derivative bonds may bring. Thus, the exclusion clause was considered by the courts to be 
reasonable under UCTA 1977. Following Peekay Intermark Ltd v Australia,111 Springwell was 
contractually estopped from contending that he was induced into entering into the contractual 
arrangement to purchase the bonds. If a corporate entity is regarded as having the adequate 
experience of an intellectual investor, then it will be contractually estopped from disputing that 
it was induced into entering into the contract. 
2. Force Majeure Clause 
Zakrzewski’s proposal that a borrower should claim that a MAC clause is in fact a force 
majeure clause is also questionable.112 Although he provides an innovative argument, it is 
unlikely that courts will find in favour of this based on the following reasons. First, Zakrzewski 
states that the function of A MAC clause is virtually identical to the nature of the force majeure 
clause and should be treated within the umbrella of the force majeure jurisprudence, because 
of the lack of case law in this area.113 Although the author agrees that both a force majeure and 
a MAC clause do share resemblances, the latter does not have an identical definition. For 
instance, Beale defines a force majeure clause as: 
any contractual term by which one, or both of the parties is excused from performance 
of the contract, in whole or in part, or is entitled to suspend performance or to claim an 
extension of time for performance, upon the happening of a specified event beyond his 
control.114 
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Second, a MAC clause has certain limitations as opposed to the force majeure clause, which 
are set out within the wording of the clause. A MAC is intended to act as a sweeping up and 
all-encompassing provision to consider events that are within the power of the borrower to 
control and prevent additional risk, even if there is an exacerbating event to the borrower’s 
circumstance. In contrast, a force majeure clause is intended to cover specific events that are 
outside of the control and responsibility of the borrower’s power.115 For instance, this could 
include an act of God (extreme weather conditions or flooding), the on-going civil war in Syria, 
or the economic and political instability following Brexit. The international law firm Norton 
Rose has shed light on the correlation between political uncertainties and MAC. Using the 
banking system in Cyprus in 2012 as an example, Norton Rose clarified that the run on the 
banks would not trigger an adverse event of default, since this was a political, social, and 
economically driven force majeure in the financial markets. Although Zakrzewski 
acknowledges that a MAC clause has additional functions to a force majeure clause, he 
suggests ‘adopting the jurisprudence that has developed around force majeure clauses’116 and 
applying this to MAC clauses. In the opinion of the author, it would be a misnomer to adopt 
this argument. The case law in this area would have to be disregarded, since commercially a 
MAC clause shifts the risks of harmful events or changes onto the borrower, whereas a force 
majeure clause only acts to excuse one of the party’s obligations. 117 Thus, the doctrine of strict 
liability still applies with reference to the MAC clause. In contrast, the doctrine does not apply 
when a force majeure clause has been stipulated in a contract, as there would be an element of 
debt relief or forgiveness for non-performance. 
3. Contractual Protections 
Alternatively, a borrower could ask the lender to apply an objective interpretation of what is 
meant by the term ‘material’. As Gray states, a subjective construal provides with no legal 
certainty as to whether any given set of circumstances constitute a MAC.118 Nonetheless, this 
provides scope for the creditor to draw down the loan agreement when he chooses, which is 
why loan agreements generally employ a subjective test.119 In more extreme circumstances, a 
borrower may dispute that the bank wrongly accelerated, and attempt to sue for economic torts. 
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Although an incorrect acceleration will legally result in damages, it is suggested that the 
borrower should seek to challenge the lender’s discretion, however unlikely, by applying 
contractual protections such as a de minimis threshold. It is a clause that endeavours to re-price 
the deal on a quarterly or yearly basis or impose a grace period, if the failure to pay the 
installment under the loan agreement is due to a technical error. Nevertheless, this depends on 
the individual facts of each case and the creditor’s judgment. For example, a creditor must 
consider whether it is in his interests for the loan to continue in operation as the borrower’s 
failure to meet the conditions of the loan may be the ‘tip of the iceberg’.120 This would lead to 
further deliquesce in the borrower’s financial condition. 
It is hoped that this section will provide for a set of considerations to explore for future 
borrowers who have suffered events of default. Although the aforementioned defences may be 
criticised as feeble, they offer the borrower the opportunity to make the most of a difficult 
position. The author agrees with Zackrzewski that these defences ‘would require rather 
exceptional circumstances to be established at trial’.121 Hence, the relief of forfeiture doctrine 
may be considered a more substantial defence for a borrower to challenge a bank in court. 
However, it remains to be seen whether the case of Cukurova was an exception to case law, 
decided on the basis of its facts, or whether it will be used by courts in future. 
 
F. CONCLUSION 
This paper has articulated the relevant cases and considered the property doctrine of relief from 
forfeiture. It has established that following Cukurova, the pendulum does not swing only in the 
direction of a lender. Now, it swings more equally to the borrower as well. It appears that equity 
will be able to intervene in a financial context when a MAC clause has occurred, effectively 
leading to an event of default. Focusing on equity’s development throughout the common law, 
the paper has presented a case study of the orthodox position, placing particular focus on 
Concord and Cukurova. These two cases have ingeniously widened the liberty for equity to 
incorporate a property law doctrine and shield a defaulting borrower. In conclusion, it will be 
exciting to see how the MAC clauses will evolve, following the ensuing case law. It is expected 
that there is scope for equity to intervene and mitigate the severity of a material adverse change 
clause, when an event of default has been triggered following the intrusion of relief from 
forfeiture. 
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